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Recent court decisions examining the utility of expressed sequence tags, or 
ESTs, may change the manner in which some companies are able to investigate 
unknown genes.  Limiting patentability of genetic research will only logically slow 
the innovation and understanding of genetic research.  Consider the following 
hypothetical: SMALL, a biotech company, which during its research regarding a 
cure for disease XYZ, finds an EST that codes for a gene of no known function.  
Although its research shows this gene to have some “biological activity” with 
respect to XYZ, the company otherwise has no other leads.  However, SMALL is 
aware that without knowing the underlying function of the gene for this EST, the 
claims for its patent must be extremely limited as defined by In re Fisher.1
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1 In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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SMALL decides to keep its research secret and continues to research in-house and 
not file a patent due to its claim to this EST being limited.  Years later BIG, 
another biotech company, finds that XYZ is cured through the same gene which 
SMALL originally discovered but abandoned for lack of funds. 
In 2005, the Federal Court of Appeals held in the case of In re Fisher, that 
ESTs lacked utility and were therefore unpatentable.2  Yet, these simple adenine 
(A), thymine (T), guanine (G), and cytosine (C) combinations are the codes for all 
living organisms and it seems that these should be patentable3 in the face of the 
1980 case Diamond v. Chakrabarty,4  where the court famously held that 
“anything under the sun that is made by man” is patentable.5
The issue addressed by the court in Fisher was whether the discovered EST 
was useful.  But, if we look to the dissent, we find that there are significant 
arguments why the invention should be useful and, furthermore, that it may be 
useful in multiple ways.  Such an invention, short sequences of DNA, is really the 
discovery of a naturally-occurring structure,6 and is arguably not patentable on its 
face; but the patentable contribution of the inventor is in the discovery of such a 
structure rather than in the creation of such a structure.7
Recently, in response to the many thousands of EST applications,8 courts 
have made patenting of EST sequences more difficult in order to reduce the 
number of applications for ESTs with unknown uses.9  The Fisher decision has 
taken a strong stance against EST claims which are either not directed to a known 
target or known gene or, alternatively, attempt to claim entire genes or proteins 
based on the EST only.10  This intensification of the utility standard will force 
many inventors to take a new look at their research with ESTs. 
Under the SMALL scenario, the 2005 Fisher decision is a hurdle which 
                                                          
2 Id. at 1368-1369. 
3 Philippe Ducor, Recombinant Products and Nonobviousness: A Typology, 13 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 1, 31-32 (1997).  Where the author states that “[concerning naturally 
occurring DNA’s], [i]n such inventions, the contribution of the inventor resides in the discovery of a 
naturally-occurring structure rather than in the creation of a new structure or of part of it.”  Id.  That the 
essence of such an invention is not that there is a new structure, but that one has properly identified a 
structure that either relates to some protein or some other filler in the DNA strand.  Id.
4 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
5 Id. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 1979 at 5 (1972); H.R. REP. NO.1293 at 6 (1952)). 
6 Ducor, supra note 3 at 31-32. 
7 Id.
8 Cynthia D. Lopez-Beverage, Should Congress Do Something About Upstream Clogging Caused 
by the Deficient Utility of Expressed Sequence Tag Patents?  10 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y. 35, 52 (2005).  
(Commenting that since 2000, the filing for DNA and RNA-based patents has overwhelmed the PTO.  
Because of the overwhelming number of applications, there is a significant backlog). 
9 See e.g. Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 at 1369, where claims must be specific towards the EST and not 
generally claiming the entire gene or DNA sequence.  See also 884 PLI/Par 247, 261-62, stating that in 
a first generation EST, that does not itself encode a protein, a claim will likely be rejected for 
insufficient utility unless a target of the EST is identified, and in this case, only a narrow claim will 
stand.  Id.  This is the essence of the Fisher decision, that such claims must be limited to their exact 
sequence, “SEQ ID NO:1” for example, and that a new patent could work around such claim simply by 
inserting a different three base pair code for any one of a number of amino acids.  Fisher, 421 F.3d at 
1369.  A work around would also be possible by the introduction of an intron into the sequence. 
10 Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1374. 
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limits the ability of SMALL to protect its interest.  Therefore, it decided not to 
seek a patent on the subject.11  For a number of reasons, to be discussed in this 
note, failure to patent is counter to the intentions of the patent system, including 
the promotion of scientific gains.12  This note will explore this hypothetical case as 
well as discover whether or not there is precedent for the patenting of EST 
sequences and the claims thereupon.  Finally it will explore how this precedent has 
both narrowed and expanded through court decisions over the past fifty years. 
This note will further discuss whether the federal courts have narrowed the 
utility standard too far, and in so doing, actually limit the inventive nature and 
promotion of science with regard to EST sequences.  The first section of this note 
will outline the requirements for patentability.  The second section will briefly 
introduce molecular genetics.  The third section will introduce Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty and its effect of broadening the statutory subject matter requirements 
to allow plant, animal, and DNA sequences.  The fourth section will introduce In 
re Fisher and discuss its impacts on EST utility claims, including a discussion of 
the Brenner v. Manson,13 In re Kirk14 and In re Joly15cases regarding the 
narrowing of the utility scope by requiring specific and substantial utility.  This 
section will also argue that Fisher limits patent claims, thereby impeding scientific 
progress as defined in the Constitution and potentially wasting resources by 
duplicating research.  In the fifth section, I will suggest that obviousness is a more 
reasonable alternative towards solving the problem of excessive EST patent 
applications.  Finally, I will conclude that the obviousness standard will provide 
for a more workable standard and will limit the judicial action of deciding what is 
and is not “useful” per se. 
I. REQUIREMENTS FOR PATENTABILITY
In 1793, Thomas Jefferson wrote these famous words giving rise to patent 
law in the United States: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title.”16  Jefferson, among others, wanted to promote invention 
and felt that securing rights would give inventors the protection they needed to 
continue their trade.  Congress followed these suggestions and enacted the power 
to grant patents saying that, “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
                                                          
11 See generally, 421 F.3d at 1374, see also note 9 supra and accompanying text, for a more detailed 
analysis on why SMALL would not have proper protection for its invention. 
12 See e.g. U.S. Const. art. I § 8, cl. 8 (stating that the intention of the patent system is to promote 
the progress of science and useful arts).  Id.  The original Patent Act of 1793 required only utility and 
novelty.  Subsequent Acts have added additional requirements, but all still remain true, that the 
intention is to promote the progress of science, by conferring a 20 year monopoly on the invention.  Id.
13 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966). 
14 In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
15 In re Joly, 376 F.2d 906 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
16 Patent Act (1793). 
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respective Writings and Discoveries.”17
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) set up the general 
requirements necessary to receive a patent.  Under the Patent Act, Title 35 U.S.C. 
an applicant is “entitled to a patent if his invention is new, useful, nonobvious, and 
his application adequately describes the claimed invention, teaches others how to 
make and use the claimed invention, and discloses the best mode for practicing the 
claimed invention.”18 The patent then allows the inventor to exclude others from 
making, using, or selling the invention without the inventor’s permission for a 
period of 20 years from the filing date.19  The rules, generally speaking, require: 
(1) a novel invention; (2) that is nonobvious to one skilled in the art; (3) that is 
properly disclosed to allow one skilled in the art to make and use the invention; 
and (4) has at least one specific claim. 20
The requirements set out by the USPTO give specific guidelines for 
inventors to gain a patent on their inventions.21  The rules not only help further 
scientific knowledge, but they also reduce frivolous patents because of the 
stringency of the requirements.  This article will essentially look at the first and 
third rules above, 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 103; separately looking at whether an 
invention is “useful” and if it is a “process, machine, manufacture or composition 
of matter;”22 or whether it is obvious to one skilled in the art.23
Courts have held that an invention must be more than “a mere curiosity” or a 
“frivolous or trifling article or operation not aiding in the progress or increasing the 
possession of the human race.”24  Thus to have utility, in the simplest of language, 
the invention must be capable of some beneficial use.  But, in the case of ESTs and 
biotechnological inventions, it is more difficult to decide what uses are actually 
                                                          
17 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
18 Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1378.  Further, Title 35 of the U.S. Code outlines the necessary rules for a 
patent to be issued.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 112.  The original Patent Act of 1793 include essentially 
sections 101 and 102, but numerous revisions have occurred over the past 200 some years.  Id.  The 
patent laws are often changing, because of new technology and because we now live in a world where 
information can be rapidly exchanged.  Even so, these rules, in general form will likely continue to be 
present for many years.  Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.  The requirements specifically are: (1) the subject matter must be patentable; as a useful 
process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter or improvement thereof; (2) the invention must 
be novel; it cannot have been previously described in a published media, used in the public sphere or 
have been sold for more than a year before patenting; (3) the invention must not have been obvious to 
one skilled in the art; such that at the time of the filing, the invention would not have been obvious to 
one having ordinary skill in the art; and (4) that a disclosure of the invention must enable one skilled in 
the art to make and use the invention; the inventor must disclose the best mode of how to make and use 
the invention; and the invention must have at least one specific claim so that others in the field will 
know the metes and bounds of the invention.  Id.
21 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 112. 
22 Id. at §101. 
23 Id. at § 103. 
24 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 4.02., citing W. Robinson, Treatise on the Law of 
Patents for Useful Inventions 463 (1890).  The court over the past 200 years has increased or decreased 
the somewhat subjective requirements for patentability.  Id.  Sometime this comes in the form of an 
increase in utility standard as in the case of Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966).  Other times the 
court has suggested that the invention is obvious such as Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976). 
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beneficial.25  Today, current law holds that modern scientific inventions must 
prove that they are useful and not just a “scientific process exciting wonder yet not 
producing physical results,”26 and that they must also have a specific and 
substantial utility.27
II. MOLECULAR GENETICS
The claimed invention in the Fisher patent relates to isolated and purified 
DNA and cDNA, specifically, an EST which is just a short nucleotide fragment of 
a cDNA clone.28  To better understand the invention, it is essential to briefly 
discuss the function and role of such DNA. 
Genes are located on chromosomes within the nucleus of any given cell, and 
these are made up of deoxyribonucleic acid or DNA.29  Each DNA is two strands 
of nucleotides, arranged in a double helix form, which was originally discussed by 
J.D. Watson and F.H.C. Crick in a 1953 publication in Nature magazine.30  Each 
strand is composed of four bases, adenine, guanine, cytosine and thymine, 
(collectively, A,T,G,C) and each of these bases arrange themselves in opposing 
fashion with (A-T) and (G-C) each specifically bonding with one another, through 
a single hydrogen bond.31
When a gene is expressed in a particular cell, the particular strand of DNA 
that encodes for that gene is transcribed into a single strand by messenger 
ribonucleic acid (mRNA).32  This mRNA is released from the nucleus into the 
cytoplasm of a cell and used by ribosomes to produce proteins for the structure.33
Complementary DNA, (cDNA), though, is produced in a synthetic manner 
by reverse transcribing the mRNA.34  cDNA is easily created in the laboratory and, 
over the past twenty years, scientists have compiled libraries of cDNA fragments 
which help identify which genes are expressing in a cell or cell tissue at any given 
time.35
The expressed sequence tag, (EST), is simply a short strand or fragment of 
cDNA.36  Typically, ESTs are created by sequencing a sample cDNA at one end of 
the strand.37  ESTs are then often used as a marker in a sample mixture of DNA, 
                                                          
25 See e.g. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1370.  Discussing Brenner v. Manson, and the requirements for 
usefulness.  Id.  The Fisher court went to great detail to discuss that following Brenner was the proper 
standard and that for something to be useful it would need to have specific and substantial utility.  Id.
26 Chisum, supra note 24, at § 4.02., citing w. Robinson, Treatise on the Law of Patents for Useful 
Inventions 463 (1890).
27 Brenner, 383 U.S at 529. 
28 Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1366-67. 
29 See e.g. Benjamin Lewin, Genes VII (Oxford University Press, Inc. 2000). 
30 Lopez-Beverage, supra note 8 at 41. 
31 Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1367. 
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 See e.g. Benjamin Lewin, Genes VII (Oxford University Press, Inc. 2000). 
37 Id.
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because the EST will bind with its opposing pair sequence, thus identifying that a 
particular section of DNA was found in the sample.38  This identifies when 
particular sequences are expressing within a tissue at a known time, and thus 
suggests which proteins, if any, are responsible for certain actions within that 
tissue. 39  Thus, EST sequences are especially valuable and useful when 
researching a particular gene or a particular action within a body tissue because it 
is the EST that will identify when a particular sequence is within a mixture.40
III. CHAKRABARTY AND A COMPOSITION OF MATTER
Natural products, naturally occurring organisms, and natural phenomena are 
not patentable under the current patent standards because they do not fit within one 
of the areas of patentable subject matter.41  Thus, one cannot patent a natural 
mineral, a breed of dog, or the theory of gravity because these are naturally 
occurring matter or phenomena and are thus forbidden.42  Over time courts have 
expanded the limits on what qualifies a patentable subject matter.  The case for 
patenting DNA or EST sequences only became a reality when the Supreme Court 
decided in Chakrabarty that manmade, non-naturally occurring organisms were 
patentable.43  But because of the nature of genetic science, it is difficult to truly 
“see” if an EST sequence is more like a natural law and thus forbidden or more 
like a man-made organism and thus patentable.  Yet, courts have decided that EST 
sequences are patentable subject matter under the current understanding of the 
law.44
Plants and animals can be described in their most simplistic manner as a 
stunning arrangement of cells working together to create life.  Within any living 
organism there exists a tiny, but essential, set of instructions that tell these cells 
what to do.  It is this DNA, the instructions, which make each organism unique.  
Thus, the problem of patenting DNA is that one is patenting the instructions of 
how to make the organism.  This makes DNA appear to be more similar to a 
natural product which does not fall under any of the statutory subject matter 
                                                          
38 Id.
39 The Federal Circuit has discussed molecular genetics extensively in cases prior to Fisher as 
identified in note 2 in the Fisher case.  See e.g. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1554-56 (Fed. Cir. 1995); 
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200, 1207-08 (Fed. Cir 1991); In re O’Farrell, 853 
F.2d 894, 895-99 (Fed. Cir. 1988).  Furthermore, there are many significant articles that discuss the 
intricacies of the molecular issues at hand.  Instead, this article will briefly discuss the relevant genetics 
and focus on the relevant law at issue. 
40 See http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/dbEST/how_to_submit.html (last visited December 8, 2007) 
for a short description of EST sequences. 
41 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2007). 
42 Obviously, there are hundreds of examples of what is and is not patentable under the laws of the 
United States.  But the general point of this article is that something must be non-naturally occurring, as 
held by the Diamond v. Chakrabarty, decision in order to be patentable.  Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 at 
309. 
43 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309, where the Court held that “anything under the sun made by man” 
was to be patentable subject matter under § 101.  Id.
44 Id.
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requirements.45  With the expansion of subject matter, the courts have implicitly 
allowed such DNA to be patented. 
Historically, patent law dates to the early English law in 1624; yet, early law 
did not allow the patenting of live organisms.46  But Congress has expanded the 
possible subject matter requirements. This expansion began in 1930 with the Plant 
Patent Act and continued with the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) when 
Congress allowed asexual and sexual plants to have protection.47  The Acts 
immediately lifted the ban against issuing patents for plants and opened the door 
for future patenting of multicellular organisms. 
While the Plant Patent Act and the PVPA each give those who patent plant 
varieties some rights, these rights are severely limited compared to “utility” 
patents, commonly associated with inventions.48  The limitations include that a 
patent holder is required to license their technology upon a reasonable request49
and research used on a particular variety is always allowed without the owner 
having any recourse.50  Clearly, these two exceptions do not allow a PVPA patent 
holder to “exclude” one from using, making, or selling his invention in the same 
manner that a patent granted under 35 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq.,51 but it still allows one 
to protect and profit from his or her work. 
Thus, if a plant DNA application were to be filed as a “plant patent,” then the 
rights to that patent would be limited under the patent rights as discussed supra.  
However, having such limited rights would certainly limit the desirability to 
research new avenues for drugs or other inventions.  These patents work well for 
such things as plant phenotypes, such as rose varietals, giving some limited rights 
for the ingenuity.  However, the essential limitation towards granting a full patent 
is that, theoretically, the plants themselves could have created such varieties as are 
created by the inventors, therefore differentiating them from traditional utility 
patents.52  When plants are man-made or when the product is purified and isolated 
from the natural product, utility patents are permissible.53 Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty broadened the standard for statutory subject matter allowing 
                                                          
45 Ducor, supra note 3, discussing the patentability of EST sequences. 
46 Ryan M.T. Iwasaka, Chakrabarty to Chimeras: The Growing Need for Evolutionary Biology in 
Patent Law, 109 YALE L.J. 1505, 1511 (2000). 
47 Id. at 1513. 
48 35 U.S.C. §§ 161, 163 (2007). 
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at §§ 161, 271. 
52 PVPA opponents would suggest that a plant patent should never be allowed because, the inventor  
or “breeder” as it may be, is simply crossing plants, in a sexual or asexual manner, a la Gregor Mendel 
and that such an inventor is doing the work that nature could theoretically do itself.  But proponents 
would suggest that any plants or varieties created, are done through work that nature itself has either not 
created because the plants would be selected against in a Darwinian struggle, or that we are simply 
giving plants a chance to cross with plants that would not likely meet, such as plants from the USA and 
from Siberia.  See http://www.plantpatent.com/irget.hmtl, (last visited March 31, 2007).   While both 
are essentially correct on their points, the United States has, through policy reasons, chosen to reward 
new types of plants with limited protection, especially for new colors or greater vigor.  Id. 
53 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2007). 
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traditional utility patents to claim plants and animals.54
In 1980, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the issue of whether a 
man-made non-naturally occurring multicellular organism would qualify as 
patentable subject matter.55  In the original utility application, the inventors, 
realizing that animals had not been allowed to be patented, stated that the claimed 
bacteria was not an “animal” and that the rights to the organism were similar to 
those of a plant breeder.56  The Court rejected the claims for the bacterium as a 
plant because clearly it was not a plant.57  Yet, the Court realized that, although the 
bacterium were not in-fact plants, the invention was still novel and useful.58
Although it was an animal, the bacteria met all other facets of patentability and the 
Court granted the patent.59
The Chakrabarty court, finding that the bacterium was patentable, held that 
man-made, non-naturally occurring multicellular organisms fit within the § 101 
definition of “composition of matter.”60  The Court held that in regards to what is 
or is not patentable, “anything under the sun that is made by man” should fall 
within the language of the 1952 Act.61  Here, in a historic decision, the Court 
broadened the language of the Act to include any organism that was produced by 
the hands of man, including, but not-limited to, plants or animals that were not 
previously naturally occurring.62  By extension, this case extended subject matter 
to DNA and EST sequences alike, as they were produced by man and the 
purification and isolation of the DNA made these non-naturally occurring.63
In the case of Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg,64 the Court stood by its 
decision in Chakrabarty, citing Ex parte Allen,65 where a polyploidy non-naturally 
occurring oyster was held to be patentable.66  The Court stood by and affirmed the 
language of 35 U.S.C. § 101 providing that “[t]he Patent and Trademark Office 
now considers non-naturally occurring nonhuman multicellular living organisms, 
including animals, to be patentable subject matter within the scope of [§ 101].”67
While plants and animals each specifically received status as a “composition 
of matter,” other matter seemingly invented or discovered by man was still 
considered as non-patentable.68  Prohibitions still remained on such discoveries as 
                                                          
54 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 313-14 (2004). 
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 See generally id.
59 Id.
60 See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303. 
61 Id. at 309. 
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920 (1991). 
65 Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425 (1987). 
66 Quigg, 932 F.2d at 923. 
67 Id. at 922. 
68 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310. 
2007 LIMITS ON UTILITY 217 
mathematical formulae and liberal arts.69 Chakrabarty and its progeny represent a 
liberalization of the patent standards towards an ever-increasing subject matter.70
Yet, simply by isolating and purifying a DNA sequence, inventors blur the line 
between invention on the one hand and a natural product on the other hand, which 
has generally been held to be unpatentable.71  The courts, however, have held for 
the past twenty years that such sequences in a “purified and isolated” form are the 
handiwork of man and are patentable as a “composition of matter” under § 101.72
Thus, DNA sequences of all types have been held to be patentable subject matter 
under the Chakrabarty line of cases. 
Over the past fifty years, a number of patent cases have attempted to redefine 
and broaden the scope of utility.73  Today, while scientists want to promote 
invention, sometimes the inventions have gone too far and they seek to claim rights 
to things with little or no value.74  Simply because Chakrabarty declared that man-
made inventions were patentable does not equate that a man-made invention 
(whether a machine, plant, animal, chemical compound, or DNA sequences) has 
the right to be patented if it is useless.75  This line has been blurred as inventors 
have attempted to apply for patents on every invention possible, regardless of the 
utility of the invention, in the name of science, or, in the more likely scenario, in 
search of the almighty dollar. 
IV. IN RE FISHER NARROWS THE DEFINITION OF UTILITY REGARDING EST
SEQUENCES.
In 2005, when the Federal Court of Appeals decided the case of In re Fisher,
the court defined the “utility” of EST sequences and, in the process, limited the 
scope of the claimed subject matter.76  The case arose when Fisher appealed the 
USPTO’s final decision of patent No. 09/619,643 (‘643), which held that patent 
‘643 was non-patentable for lack of utility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and 35 U.S.C. § 
112 for lack of enablement.77  The Fisher application involved the claims for “five 
purified nucleic acid sequences that encode proteins and protein fragments in 
maize plants.”78  The Fisher patent included seven specific claims: (1) serving as a 
                                                          
69 Andrew Chin, Research in the Shadow of DNA Patents, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
846, 867-68 (2005).   Stating that, “products of nature and discoveries in non technological fields, such 
as pure mathematics and the liberal arts, are specifically excluded from patentability.”  Id.
70 Id. at 868, quoting Chakrabarty, on how the scope of “composition of matter” has been 
expanded, “all compositions of two or more substances and . . . all composite articles, whether they be 
the results of chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powders or 
solids.” Id.
71 Id. at 870. 
72 Id. at 873. 
73 See Chisum Supra note 24, which describes the historical lineage of the Utility requirement for 
patents. 
74 Ted Van Cleave, Totally Absurd Inventions America’s Goofiest Patents (Andrews McMeel 
Publishing) (2001). 
75 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308-10. 
76 Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1367. 
77 Id.
78 Id.
218 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW Vol. I:1 
molecular marker; (2) measuring mRNA in a sample; (3) providing a primer 
source for PCR; (4) identifying or denying the presence of sequences; (5) isolating 
promoters; (6) controlling protein expression; and (7) locating genetic molecules of 
other plants and organisms.79
Fisher appealed the final decision of the USPTO, which held that patent 
application ‘643 was unpatentable for lack of utility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and 35 
U.S.C. § 112 for lack of enablement.80  In the final rejection, the examiner found 
that the claimed uses were “not specific to the claimed ESTs but instead were 
generally applicable to any EST;”81 therefore, they were “lack[ing] a specific and 
substantial utility.”82  Although these ESTs do serve some laboratory purposes, 
they are not so specific as to warrant a patent.83 The “ESTs lacked a substantial 
utility because there was no known use for the underlying proteins produced as 
final products resulting from processes involving the claimed ESTs.”84  Finally, the 
USPTO noted that “[u]tilities that require or constitute carrying out further 
research to identify or reasonably confirm a ‘real world’ context of use are not 
substantial utilities.”85
Fisher then appealed to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences for a 
new review of the rejection of the ‘643 patent.86  The board held that the 
application “failed to explain why any of the claimed ESTs would be useful in 
detecting polymorphisms in maize plants;”87 that, “without knowing any further 
information in regard to the gene represented by an EST . . . [t]he presence or 
absence of a polymorphism provides the barest information in regard to genetic 
heritage.”88  The board also concluded that isolating a nucleic acid sequence 
without a “known utility, is not a substantial utility.”89  Thus, the board firmly 
established that the application did not provide a specific utility or benefit and 
could not be patentable.  Fisher challenged this decision by appealing to the 
Federal Court of Appeals. 
                                                          
79 Id. at 1368. 
80 Id. at 1367. 
81 Id. at 1368. Specifically, the court was discouraged by Fisher’s lack of work in proving that the 
EST had actual value.  Id.  There was considerable time spent in the discussion by the majority 
discussing that any in-vitro, in-vivo or other tests to show the use of the EST would have given the 
Fisher patent a fighting chance.  Id.  Finally, it was evident that the five claimed ESTs were really no 
different than any others created by Fisher, and the parent company Monsanto.   Fisher, 421 F.3d at 
1368.  The court felt that conferring a monopoly on a small sequence, for such little laboratory work, 
was improper, Fisher, et. al. needed to bring more to the table.  Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86  Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1368. 
87 Id.
88 Id.  The fact is that an EST gives one skilled in the art the ability to identify a nucleotide 
sequence.  Id.  An EST is essentially a guide marker for a gene and in this case the five markers (ESTs)
only marked unknown genes of unknown function of a section of DNA.  Id.  It is entirely possible that 
such areas of the gene are just introns, or areas of repeated DNA, and that the region holds little to no 
value.  Id.  But the essential point of this article is that we do not know, and it is improper to pass 
judgment on that which is unknown. 
89 Id.
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Fisher argued that § 101 requires only that an invention not be “frivolous, 
injurious to the well-being, good policy, or good morals of society.”90  The court 
agreed with Fisher that the “utility threshold is not high,” but that a patent still 
needed to “disclose only a single and specific utility pursuant to Brenner,”91
suggesting that § 101 requires more than just an invention that is not frivolous.  
The court rejected Fisher’s arguments and announced a more rigorous test echoing 
its predecessor Brenner:
The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for 
granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention 
with substantial utility.  Unless and until a process is refined and developed to this 
point – where specific benefit exists in currently available form – there is 
insufficient justification for permitting an applicant to engross what may prove to 
be a broad field.92
Brenner significantly asserts that unless the invention has a specific and substantial 
use, then it has no utility.93  Yet, this very premonition essentially allows the court 
to find any invention as unpatentable; because, it is extremely difficult to say what 
is or is not useful when the patented product is new or is so unique that its value 
cannot be readily determined. 
A. Brenner Restricts Utility to Specific and Substantial Utility 
Following the 1966 Brenner decision, the utility standard required that an 
invention have a “specific and substantial utility to satisfy § 101.”94  The case 
arose when the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) held that the 
invention “produce[d] a known product, [making] it [un]necessary to show utility 
for the product.”95  The patent discussed the manufacture of chemical compounds, 
which were similar to compounds with possible tumor-inhibiting effects in mice.96
The Appeals board found that “usefulness of a product cannot be presumed merely 
because it happens to be closely related to another compound which is known to be 
useful.”97  The CCPA reversed, holding that “where a claimed process produces a 
known product, it is not necessary to show utility for the product.”98  The USPTO 
sought certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted, to resolve the dispute over 
what constituted utility.99
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the meaning of utility in 
                                                          
90  Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1369.  This argument was also brought in Application of Nelson, 47 
C.C.P.A., 1031, 1040, (1960). 
91 Id. at 1370. 
92 Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534-35 (emphasis added). 
93 Id.
94 Fisher, 421 F3d. at 1371.  See also Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1563 (1996). 
95 Brenner, 383 U.S. at 522. 
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
220 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW Vol. I:1 
reference to a chemical patent.100  The Court held that “a simple, everyday word 
can be pregnant with ambiguity when applied to the facts of life,”101 suggesting 
that the definition from the Patent Act of 1793 may not always appropriately 
determine utility.102  The Court noted that “[i]t was never intended that a patent be 
granted upon a product, or a process producing a product, unless such product be 
useful.”103  Essentially, the Court held that an invention lacks utility “[u]nless and 
until a process is refined and developed to this point – where specific [and 
substantial] benefits exists in currently available form – there is insufficient 
justification for permitting an applicant to engross what may prove to be a broad 
field.”104
In the case of Brenner, the patent application identified a compound of 
unknown use, while Fisher’s application claimed five ESTs hybridizing to genes 
of unknown use.105  Seemingly, in each case, more research was needed to identify 
the scope and extent of the invention would have made each application stronger; 
but the application as filed did not explain the whole picture.106  Thus, the Fisher
decision affirmed Brenner, holding that there must be a specific and substantial 
utility for the EST sequences to achieve utility under § 101.107  As a result, under 
the original claims in the Fisher application, there must have been a claimed 
specific and substantial utility before the Fisher application would meet the § 101 
utility requirements. 
Following the Brenner decision, the courts were again faced with a utility 
question surrounding chemical compounds.108 In re Joly and In re Kirk both 
involved applications for patents involving chemical intermediates, each of which 
produced chemical compounds of no known use.  In both cases, the court rejected 
the argument that “disclosure of a steroid as useful as an intermediate to make 
other steroids by specified reactions [was] an adequate disclosure of utility.”109
The Joly court held that simply because a chemical compound was “closely 
related” in structure to compounds of known usefulness does not confer utility.110
In Kirk, the court rejected the argument that compounds showing valuable 
“biological properties” were useful; instead, the court reasoned that the compounds 
were ambiguous and lacking in utility.111  Both cases confirmed that chemical 
intermediates producing a compound of no known utility renders the chemical 
                                                          
100 Id.
101  Brenner, 383 U.S. at 529. 
102 The Court in Brenner suggested that the 1793 Act did not provide enough guidance and nuance 
as is needed and appropriate for the inventions of the time; that what was once useful, or could be 
dreamed to be useful today, is far different from what was envisioned just some 200 years ago.  
Brenner, 383 U.S. at 529. 
103 Id.
104 Id. at 534-35. 
105 Id.
106 Id.; see also Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1375. 
107 Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534-35. 
108 See generally Brenner, 383 U.S. 519. 
109 Joly, 376 F.2d 906. 
110 Id. at 907-08. 
111 Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1375. 
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intermediate itself unpatentable for lack of utility.112
The facts of Fisher are even more similar to Kirk and Joly than to 
Brenner.113  Where the Kirk and Joly applications each claimed utility of certain 
chemical intermediates producing unknown compounds, Fisher claimed utility for 
an EST which marked an unknown gene.  Furthermore, each application asserted 
value to a compound or gene which itself was useless at the time of filing.  In each 
case, the patent was rejected for lack of utility because the compounds “were 
useful only as intermediates in the synthesis of other compounds of unknown 
use.”114  The Court of Appeals in Fisher held that ESTs were analogous to the 
chemical intermediaries of Joly and Kirk and thus confirmed the lack of utility for 
similar reasons.  Fisher did not, in the court’s view, have a total understanding of 
the gene or underlying protein such that it was reasonable to grant an exclusive 
patent thereupon.115 Fisher, like Joly and Kirk, did not claim a specific and 
substantial utility; thus the patent did not meet § 101 utility standard as defined 
under Brenner.116
Absent any specific and substantial utility, Brenner holds that a patent is not 
useful and thus does not meet the requirements as set forth under the USPTO 
requirements.117  Thus, while almost any idea can be patentable, even completely 
ridiculous inventions, it must have a specific and substantial utility to pass the 
requirements under the Brenner decision.118
B. Specific Utility 
According to the Utility Guidelines of the USPTO, specific utility is 
“particular to the subject matter claimed and would not be applicable to a broad 
class of invention.”119  The “specific” utility requirement of an application must 
“disclose a use which is not so vague as to be meaningless”120 and an application 
must describe the invention in terms that are not merely “nebulous expressions [of] 
biological activity.”121  Finally, the properties that are defined in a specification 
must assert a value that is well-defined and provides a “particular benefit to the 
public.”122  Specific utility must not just be a broad general statement of what the 
class of the invention can do but the specification must also disclose what this 
invention in particular actually does.123  Fisher’s seven claims were too broad; it 
was this breadth within the claims that was disproportionate to the contributions of 
                                                          
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1375; see also 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
118 Id.
119 Id. at 1372. 
120 Id. at 1371. 
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
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the inventors.124
The court did not find that Fisher’s arguments were significantly persuasive 
to overcome the burden of proving utility.125  Fisher’s alleged uses were found to 
be “so general as to be meaningless;”126 in other words, the same uses could be 
applied to not just these five ESTs but to any EST or sequence for that matter 
derived from any different plant or animal organism.127  Fisher’s invention serves 
no utility because the invention serves as “merely starting points for further 
research, not the end point of any research effort.”128  Further, that any uses 
suggested by Fisher are not specific claims but are only a “laundry list”129 of 
research plans, tools or methods, and none with a substantial benefit in its currently 
available form.130  Therefore, the court in Fisher limits utility to only those ESTs 
that give an immediate benefit to the public in its current form.131
C. Substantial Utility 
The USPTO Utility Guidelines have exclaimed that a substantial utility 
defines a “real world” use.132  “If a utility requires further research, then it does not 
constitute a substantial utility under these Guidelines.”133  The CCPA has stated 
that “practical (substantial) utility is a shorthand way of attributing ‘real-world’ 
value to claimed subject matter.”134  There must be some “immediate benefit to the 
public” for an invention to have substantial utility.135  The benefit Fisher’s ESTs 
provided was to identify the specific underlying genes of the EST sequences.136
The court held that the benefit conferred was simply too small compared to the 
breadth of the asserted claims to confer utility over the entire gene in which the 
EST probed.137
What, then, does Fisher actually teach us about the state of chemical and 
sequence based patent applications?  According to the Federal Court of Appeals 
and in reference to In re Jolles,138 Nelson v. Bowler139 and Cross v. Iizuka,140
utility may be found in a variety of manners.  Utility exists when the applicant 
proved that the compound gave a specific use which had generally been fully 
                                                          
124  Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1371. 
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1371. 
131 Id.
132 Id. at 1372. 
133 Id.
134 Id. at 1371. 
135 Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856 (C.C.P.A. 1980). 
136 Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1371. 
137 Id.
138 In re Jolles, 628 F.2d 1322 (C.C.P.A. 1980). 
139 Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853 (C.C.P.A. 1980). 
140 Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
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researched as to its effects.141  Applicants have used: (1) in vivo data; (2) in vitro 
data; (3) pharmacological tests on animals; and (4) shown an actual DNA or 
protein target.142  In each case, the applicant knew that the protein, chemical 
compound, or sequence had value because it was effective or useful in one or more 
of the listed applications.143  Fisher did not attempt to prove his claims by any of 
the above listed applications; instead, he provided a simple list of what the claimed 
ESTs could in theory do.144  The Fisher court held that without a firm indication of 
what the ESTs could actually do, it was not reasonable to grant a patent on the 
matter as claimed.145
But the Fisher court failed to recognize that, while specific and substantial 
utility is required for chemical compounds and intermediates, in the case of EST 
sequences such utility is immaterial.146  On the surface, it appears that chemical 
compounds and ESTs are remarkably similar; but this is not always true.147  While 
both chemical compounds and EST sequences may have homologous known 
materials, small changes in each can have huge effects on its use.148  The 
difference lies in the fact that, in the present form, the chemical intermediaries in 
Joly and Kirk were useless while the ESTs in Fisher did have a use.149  ESTs, 
regardless if they are targeted to a known protein, actually mark and identify such 
a gene or protein on which they sit.150  This use, while seemingly trivial, allows 
one to test for the gene in a number of applications.151  For example, ESTs can be 
used to test for activation of the gene within an experiment.152  Thus the need to 
have a known use, as in chemical compounds, is unfounded in EST sequences 
                                                          
141 See e.g. Jolles, 628 F.2d 1322; Bowler, 626 F.2d 853; Iizukia, 753 F.2d 1040. 
142 Applicants in the Jolles, Nelson and Cross patents all made statements of utility, but based their 
claims on scientific data from their research.  Jolles, 628 F.2d 1322, Nelson, 626 F.2d 853, Cross, 753 
F.2d 1040.   The difference between these cases and the Fisher patent is that Fisher did not properly 
qualify his research through some accepted research practice to show that the ESTs in the patent were 
directed to some actual protein target.   Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1376. 
143 See e.g. Nelson, 626 F.2d 853, In re Jolles, 628 F.2d 1322, Cross, 753 F.2d 1040.  Where in 
vivo data, or in vitro data was used to test the applicability and vale of the compounds at issue.  See e.g.
Nelson, 626 F.2d 853, In re Jolles, 628 F.2d 1322, Cross, 753 F.2d 1040.  The applicants here 
supported the asserted claims with data showing that the compounds specifically provided the claimed 
function.  See e.g. Nelson, 626 F.2d 853, In re Jolles, 628 F.2d 1322, Cross, 753 F.2d 1040. 
144 Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1376. 
145 Id.  Of course, this is the strength of this decision, that the Federal Circuit is requiring inventors 
to bring patents before the USPTO only when they in fact have value and not when they are merely 
early stages of an invention.  Id.  Inventors must fully analyze and research their inventions before they 
bring them before the USPTO before a patent will be granted.  Id.  When inventions are truly novel and 
actually confer value, few issues such as faced by Fisher in this case arise.  Id. 
146 Id.
147  Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1376. 
148 See id.  Where the small changes in chemical structure can lead to large changes in function.  
Chemical compounds along with proteins are known exert great changes in their physical properties and 
chemical efficacy from small changes resulting in different shape or binding ability. 
149 Id.  The use in the Fisher case is that the ESTs may be used in any of the asserted manners as 
suggested by the applicant in Fisher.  Id.  But convincing the court that an EST has value, while a novel 
chemical compound has no value, has proved to be too difficult a task.  Id. 
150 Id.
151  Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1376. 
152 Id.
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since they have a use without regard to the identity of the underlying gene. 
D. The Brenner Court Concerns 
The Brenner court was primarily concerned with creating an unwarranted 
monopoly to the detriment of the public: 
Whatever weight is attached to the value of encouraging disclosure and of 
inhibiting secrecy, we believe a more compelling consideration is that a process 
patent in the chemical field, which has not been developed and pointed to the 
degree of specific utility, creates a monopoly of knowledge which should be 
granted only if clearly commanded by the statute.  Until the process claim has been 
reduced to production of a product shown to be useful, the metes and bounds of that 
monopoly are not capable of precise delineation.  It may engross a vast unknown 
and perhaps unknowable area.  Such a patent may confer power to block off whole 
areas of scientific development, without compensating benefit to the public . . .  But 
a patent is not a hunting license.  It is not a reward to the search, but compensation 
for its successful conclusion.153
The Brenner concern is valid and is still of concern, but for different reasons than 
the Fisher case.154  The concern should not be that we are creating such a 
monopoly; rather, that we are limiting disclosure and encouraging secrecy due to a 
narrow utility standard.155  While it is extremely important in chemical cases to 
identify the actual underlying compound of interest when making a chemical 
intermediate, this is unnecessary in the patenting of an EST.156  Useless chemicals 
have no function or value in contrast to ESTs or DNA sequences which can (and 
do) code for proteins and maintain significant commercial value.157  Although 
these underlying proteins, or the underlying gene as in Fisher, did not have any 
known use it is precisely in these areas that future research will be directed towards 
seeking to unlock the mystery of diseases, functions of genes, or other 
breakthroughs.158
In light of this, the Fisher court, while echoing that a patent is not a “hunting 
license,” should also acknowledge that without a patent it is not feasible to 
undertake the immense financial burden of unlocking the potential of gene or a 
                                                          
153 Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534-36. 
154 Id.;, see also Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1365. 
155 U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 8.  If, for example an EST was found, but not disclosed this would be 
contrary to the intent of the patent laws.  Id.  The point of a patent is of dual nature, you disclose the 
invention, including how to make and use it, for a limited period of exclusive use.  Id.  Secrecy seems to 
be contrary to the goals of the founders, although they may not have been able to imagine the current 
state of patents as it currently exists in the 21st century. Id.
156 See Brenner, 383 U.S. 519.  If a chemical exists but has not effect in-vivo or in-vitro, or in any 
biological system then by its inherent inability to react becomes less valuable to cause effects in a body.  
The EST on the other hand can and will be used in the laboratory to identify genes, thus it will have 
some use, even if it is identifying a gene or section of cDNA of no known use.  Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365. 
157 Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1370. 
158  This may not always be true, as many areas of the genome include a redundancy, or introns, that 
do not translate any protein.  Nonetheless, one can assume that the future breakthroughs will come from 
unexpected places as we learn more about the systems which we are studying.
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particular protein.159  ESTs provide a research tool to identify a specific sequence 
and in this manner, even though they do not code for a known useful gene or 
protein, they themselves should be patentable.  The question becomes, which of 
these ESTs are useful and which are merely lists of potential EST sequences 
identified by a computer program?  Ostensibly, both may have value, but which 
sequences will prove valuable is the million dollar question.  Therefore, it is 
inappropriate to reject sequences simply because they may target an unknown 
region of the genome.160
It is fruitful to look at Example 9 of the USPTO’s “revised Interim Utility 
Guidelines Training Materials” to see that a “cDNA fragment disclosed as being 
useful as a probe to obtain the full length gene corresponding to a cDNA fragment 
was deemed to lack a specific and substantial utility.”161  Furthermore, claims for 
“utility” as “gene probe[s]” or “chromosome marker[s]” fail to satisfy the utility 
requirement unless the invention points to a specific DNA target, which is also 
disclosed and which also possesses some utility itself.162  Essentially, the claims of 
Fisher’s ESTs are nothing more than “research intermediates that may help 
scientists to isolate the particular . . . genes.”163  According to Brenner, such claims 
and invention would merely be “object[s] of use-testing” which provides no 
assurance that the invention has any useful value.164
Example 9 of the USPTO materials reaches to the root of the problem that a 
small cDNA fragment, or in the case of Fisher, an EST, should not give rise to a 
claim for the entire full length gene that corresponds to that marker.  However, the 
need to point to a specific gene is too narrow for the field and will limit research 
on new and inherently unknown areas.165  Furthermore, as these genes become 
known, the USPTO may be forced to grant patents on these known genes 
intensifying the need for a different standard.  The essence of the Fisher decision is 
that a claim for the entire sequence marked by the EST is not proper; while a full 
length DNA sequence is inherently patentable and proper.166  The court goes too 
far in saying that an EST does not have any utility or that it lacks utility as a 
research tool; a closer analysis reveals that an EST does in-fact serve as a proper 
research tool.167
E. Research Tools 
Fisher’s final argument was that ESTs were similar to a microscope, in that 
each is a “research tool.”168 Instead, the court held that whether an invention is 
                                                          
159 Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1376. 
160 See supra note 35. 
161 Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1372-73. 
162 Id. at 1373. 
163 Id.
164 Brenner, 383 U.S. at 535. 
165 Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1380 (J. Radar, dissenting). 
166 See generally id.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 1380. 
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useful as a research tool does not then confer that the invention is “useful” in a 
patent sense.169  While many previous research tools such as the microscope, 
telescope, NMR,170 GC-MC,171 LC-MS,172 etc. have been held to be patentable the 
court quickly points out that this analogy is flawed.173  The court held that the 
difference is that a microscope has the benefit of immediately revealing the 
structure of its target.174  Instead of being useful, the court held that the ESTs, 
while they enable one to generate data, cannot immediately reveal the structure or 
“the functions of the underlying gene.”175 Fisher’s claims assert “hypothetical 
possibilities” which the ESTs could achieve but none that would have real world 
applicability.176  Specifically, if any of the claims were to actually isolate 
promoters or useful proteins Fisher has failed to provide the evidence of such 
value.177  Nor has Fisher disclosed or established any uses as a molecular marker 
or that any of the ESTs corresponds to any maize protein of any value.178
The court’s holding in regard to ESTs lacking any utility is flawed.  As 
detailed in the dissent, it is apparent that there is utility and that the commercial 
success notwithstanding is further proof of the success of such a research tool.179
Justice Rader commented in the dissent that “if the claimed ESTs qualify as 
research tools, then they have a ‘specific’ and ‘substantial’ utility sufficient for § 
101.”180  Thus, the test for utility in this case should not have focused on whether 
there was specific and substantial utility, for this exists if ESTs are research tools; 
                                                          
169 Id.
170 E.g., US Patent 4,998,976; US patent 5,063,934. 
171 E.g., EP 0,708,475: Mass spectra deconvolution method; Gray, Zachary A.; Abel, Roger H. 
Hewlett-Packard Company; 1995, US 4,807,148; Deconvolving chromatographic peaks; Lacey; 
Richard F. , Palo Alto, CA; Hewlett-Packard Company, Palo Alto, CA; 1989. 
172 E.g., US Patent 5,495,108. 
173 Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1373.  The majority in Fisher suggests that such examples, such as the 
microscope confer a real world benefit.  Id.  The problem with this analysis is that we are allowing the 
Court to determine what is and is not useful.  What may be useful to one may be junk to another, clearly 
the old saying “one man’s trash is another man’s treasure,” could not be more appropriate in this 
instance.  Id.  A microscope in many cases does no more than reveal a physical structure; where as an 
EST sequence may do no more that signal the presence of a DNA or cDNA sequence.  Id.  Each may be 
instrumental to some and utterly useless to others, simply depending on the experiment or the detail 
required.  Id.
174 Id.
175  Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1373. 
176 Id.  The dissent states, in direct opposition to the majority, that the EST may in fact be useful in 
the laboratory and therefore has a specific and substantial utility.  Surprisingly, the majority does not 
attempt to assert any utility on the product, but instead suggests that it is the fault of the petitioner for 
his lack of detail regarding the usefulness of the inventions.  Id.
177 Id.  While it is interesting to note that both promoters and proteins would prove to be extremely 
valuable.  A promoter is simply a region of the gene that allows the gene to be transcribed. Each
sequence must have a promoter to enable the sequences to be transcribed and created by the ribosome 
within the cell body.  Absent the promoter, there will be not action. Proteins are the result of a 
transcribed region of the gene.  Proteins are some of the most essential chemicals with the body, 
allowing use to function.
178 Id. at 1374.  Both promoters and proteins, as discussed supra note 177, are valuable, but so 
would be a sequence, or EST that enabled one to identify when such a sequence, corresponding to the 
protein or promoter was active or present in a particular mixture.  Id. 
179  Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1370. 
180 Id. at 1379. (J. Rader, dissenting). 
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rather the test should be whether these particular ESTs do or do not enhance 
research.181  If the latter, then Brenner will control and the ESTs may fail for lack 
of utility.182  Furthermore, where Joly’s and Kirk’s applications failed because 
their intermediates produced compounds of no known use, the ESTs in Fisher have 
a clear known use within the laboratory setting.  Thus, we should differentiate 
Fisher from In re Joly and In re Kirk, on the basis that the EST is useful because it 
in fact has known and actual use. 
V. SOLUTIONS FOR EST UTILITY: NON-OBVIOUSNESS
The dissent suggests that the court should have addressed the patent under 
the obviousness standard, instead of resurrecting the heightened utility standard of 
Brenner.183 Obviousness allows the court to see if the patent as presented would 
be obvious to one skilled in the art.184  Such a standard properly allows the court to 
judge whether the invention provides any new leap in the field, or whether it is 
merely an adaptation or small change on the existing published material.185
Obviousness prevents the court from determining whether the invention will be 
useful or not, simply based on their impressions of the invention and not on its real 
world value and applicability.186
The court’s holding in Fisher will clearly limit the breadth of EST claims in 
future applications.187  But, its unintentional consequences in this holding will do 
more harm than good.  As Justice Rader suggested in the dissent, the patent office 
does not know which steps will contribute to a substantial breakthrough in 
genomic study.188  Because of the nature of genomic research and that of ESTs, to 
hold that a genetic sequences of any length may not be useful because it does not 
claim to a specific useful gene, or hold out some other substantial use, is simply 
ignoring the complex nature of the science and its potential value within the 
laboratory.189
To be patentable, an invention must not only be useful, but also novel and 
non-obvious.190  Interestingly, among these requirements, it is non-obviousness 
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182 Id., if the EST does in-fact enhance research it will have substantial value, absent any research 
functionality, it will serve as a placeholder in the vast array of known sequences. 
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 See e.g. KSR Int’l Co. v Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007); Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 
1 (1966). 
186 Id.
187 See e.g. 884 PLI/PAT 247, 261 (2007), stating that in an instance such as the Fisher decision, 
the patent applicant will have to prove that the EST corresponds to a particular protein or gene, and that 
even when the practitioner can show that the EST has a target, that only a very narrow claim will be 
allowed.
188 Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1379 (J. Rader, dissenting).  Again the dissent correctly states that utility is 
not proper.  When faced with the unknown, suggesting that it inherently has no value appears to be the 
wrong analysis. 
189 See generally, Chisum supra note 24. 
190 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, which states that an invention must be useful, novel and nonobvious.  
Furthermore the invention must enable one skilled in the art to use the invention and it must also give 
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that provides for the greatest legal uncertainty as to patentability.191  Under the 
original 1793 Patent Act, utility and novelty existed as the only requirements for 
patentability.192  It was not until 1851 in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood that the Supreme 
Court decided that patentability required something more than just utility and 
novelty.193 Hotchkiss recited: 
Unless more ingenuity and skill were required. . .than were possessed by an 
ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absence of that 
degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention.  
In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the 
inventor.194
But it was not until the Patent Act of 1952, when Congress codified the essential 
holding of Hotchkiss that the law became firmly grounded in statute.195 However, 
as with many laws, the original version as created by Congress was not without 
flaws and in 1966 the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co., clarified the 
test for obviousness.196  It requires that: (1) the scope and content of the prior art 
are to be determined; (2) differences between the prior art and the claims at issue 
are to be ascertained; and (3) the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art 
resolved.197  Finally, the Court suggested that secondary considerations “may have 
relevancy.”198
If the “prior art provides the motivation of suggestion for making an 
invention, the invention may be non-obvious – hence patentable – [only] if no 
enabling method is available at the time the invention is made.”199  As applied to 
Fisher, such enabling method would have been available.  Most likely, EST 
sequences are created by a mechanized or computerized program or process.  The 
fact that the maize genome may not have been fully completed at the time does not 
inherently suggest that the five EST sequences in the patent were not available 
someplace, or were not suggested through teachings of any number of prior 
                                                          
the best mode contemplated by the inventor and the specification must end with at least one claim as to 
give the proper scope as to the claimed invention. 
191 Ducor, supra note 3 at 11, discussing that the nonobvious condition is the most difficult concept 
in patent law.  Id.  There have been a number of standards over the course of lifetime of the nonobvious 
standard, and really there existed no proper standard until the Hotchkiss standard was codified in § 103 
of the Patent Act of 1952.  Id.  Even after the 1952 Act, the nonobvious standard has undergone 
changes, most specifically the discussion in Graham v. John Deere, and most recently the Supreme 
Court case, under review of KSR International v. Teleflex, Inc. Id.
192 Ducor, supra note 3 at 11 
193 Id.
194 Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 266 (1850). 
195 Ducor, supra note 3 at 12. 
196 Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
197 Id. at 37-39. 
198 Graham, 383 U.S. 1; see also Ducor, supra note 3 at 40.  Because later court decision have said 
that secondary consideration must always be taken into account in determining whether a patent is 
nonobvious.  Ducor, supra note 3 at 40.   Furthermore, there is significant evidence of nonobviousness 
that includes not just commercial success, but also considers the failure of others, unexpected results, 
evidence of copying, skepticism in the profession, and licensing, among others.  Id.
199 Id. at 33.  Enablement as used here requires only that the inventor has a reasonable expectation 
of success to make the invention. 
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publications.200
In Amgen v. Chugai,201 the Federal Circuit held that even if the prior art 
suggested that it was “obvious to try” to find a particular sequence, if there was no 
reasonable expectation of success, then such process was non-obvious.202  This 
standard would certainly doom the Fisher patent, as by today’s standards creation 
of any EST sequences is a routine process automatically created by computers.203
But these cases were overruled by In re Deuel,204 which held that the reasonable 
expectation of success was improper.205  But this is certainly an improper analysis 
for DNA-like sequences, as they are not created in a mechanical manner such as 
chemical compounds.206
The In re Deuel standard suggests that structural similarities in chemical 
compounds will make one obvious as to another.207  But, in regards to DNA based 
structures such as the ESTs at issue here, they clearly have a similar structure 
based on the double helix.208  Anyone skilled in the art or one that has taken basic 
genetics209 knows that there are numerous ways to code for many of the amino 
acids, and that a different section of code can actually code for the same protein.210
Instead, the standard for ESTs must focus on a system where any EST created that 
corresponds to an already created sequence, within some similarity, such as 90-
                                                          
200 Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1367. 
201 Amgen v. Chugai, 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
202 Id. at 1208. 
203 Ducor, supra note 3 at 35.  EST sequences, like any other sequence is readily and effortlessly 
created on sequencing machines, essentially automated processes that determine the sequence of a 
particular nucleotide sample. 
204 In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
205 Id.
206 Id. at 43-45.  Chemical compounds may be “created” or envisioned on a computer program or in 
times past, may have been written on the chalkboard.  Each compound has certain “active sites” and it 
is these areas of the compound that give its functionality.  Thus, chemical engineers look at the active 
site of the chemical and add or subtract features from it to create chemicals with new functionality.  
Such simple examples such as adding a single hydrogen instead of a double bond, or adding an oxygen 
group or a phenol ring would all add to a structure.   But also, these additions may make small changes 
to an area but create a different chirality for the compound or left and right enantiomers.  Such changes 
can make amazing changes or no change at all.  For example, the class of opiate compounds, such as 
morphine, heroin, and codeine are all amazingly similar in structure but have significantly different 
effects in the body.  See http://www.a1b2c3.com/drugs/opi005.htm (last visited January 1, 2007). 
207 See generally In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552. 
208 As identified briefly in the “genetics” section of this paper, the structure of the DNA is a double-
helix shape, with pairs of amino acids bonding through a single hydrogen that create the structure.  It is 
clear that all structures will have essentially the same shape, although there will be differences in the 
actual structure because of the slight differences in the amino acids, making even a single base pair 
change, resulting in a very small difference. 
209 A basic element of genetics is that there are many ways in which to code for any of the naturally 
occurring amino acids. 
210 This happens because each set of three bases codes for a single amino acid.  For example 
Leucine (L), Serine (S), and Arginine (R) are all coded for six different ways:  (L): CTT, CTC, CTA, 
CTG, TTA, TTG; (S):  TCT, TCC, TCA, TCG, AGT, AGC; (R):  CGT, CGC, CGA, CGG, AGA, 
AGG.  While there are also two amino acids that are only coded for by single code patterns, Methionine 
(M), ATG; and Tryptophan (W), TGG.  This shows the significant difference between the amino acids 
and shows how a single change in base pairs can make a significant difference or none at all.  See
http://www.cbs.dtu.dk/courses/27619/codon.html, for a full chart of the twenty amino acids and their 
potential coding pairs (last visited January 31, 2007). 
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95% similar, must not be considered novel.211  This system is not perfect, but 
nonetheless when one creates sequences from a “library,” it seems that it is 
inherently obvious to anyone skilled in the art of how to make and use such 
sequences.212  Thus, either only truly novel sequences should receive protection or 
all sequences should get protection.213  Finally, sequences in which the character of 
the underlying gene or protein is identified should qualify for protection, because 
such functional sequences inherently confer more value than those to which the 
underlying gene is unknown.214
A. The Fisher Patent is Obvious
The court in Fisher is in error in holding that EST sequences are not useful, 
as they certainly hold value.  But the patent may still fail under an obviousness 
test, which would provide a more concrete foothold for future patents instead of 
resurrecting the heightened utility standard from Brenner.215  The purpose of a 
patent is to provide a platform for, and to reward ingenuity.  It is not for the Court 
to determine if an invention is useful or not.216  The essence of the Brenner
decision is that it allows the court to determine the usefulness of a patent without 
first letting the market determine if it is in-fact useful.217
Most recently, the supreme court reaffirmed the strength of the Graham
analysis, holding that the method developed by the Federal Circuit requiring a 
“teaching, suggestion or motivation,” did not conform with long  held standards.218
Non-obviousness analysis under the Graham v. John Deere standard will serve as 
the framework for determining whether an EST is patentable.219  Under this 
analysis we analyze the following four (4) factors: 
                                                          
211 Wesley Elsberry, Sequences and Common Descent How We Can race Ancestry Through 
Genetics, http://www.antievolution.org/people/wre/evc/argresp/sequence.html (last visited 3/31/07).  To 
further analyze, if a sequence of 500 base pairs is identical to another 500 base pair sequence, they are 
obviously the same.  Id.  Yet if a sequence of 500 base pairs is not identical, but still codes for the 
identical protein, these too must be considered to be related.  Thus, if one sequence is 95% similar and 
codes for the identical protein as to a second sequence, then the second created sequences must not be 
considered novel, based upon the first sequence.  Id. 
212 See e.g. Graham, 383 U.S. 1. 
213 See e.g. Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365. 
214 Id.
215 Brenner, 383 U.S. 519, created the standard that a patent must have specific and substantial 
utility. Id.  This Judicially created standard is different from the original intent of the Patent Act of 
1793 standard that required only “useful.”  Id.   While the original standard is vague, the intent was to 
force inventors to create something that could be used.  Id.  Courts, inventors and the public have found 
that many things happen to be useful that on first appearance seem trivial.  Id.  It is not for the court to 
decide what is “substantially” useful and this is the inherent flaw and the increased standard found in 
the Brenner decision.  Id. 
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 KSR Int’l Co. v Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007). 
219 Graham, 383 U.S. 1. 
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1. The Scope and Content of the Prior Art 
The ESTs in Fisher’s application were for Zea mays, or better known to the 
layman as maize or corn.220  At the time of the application the Maize genome was 
beginning to be described.221  Certainly many important genes had already been 
discovered in a number of similar plants, among them Arabidopsis Thaliania (A. 
Thaliana), Glycine Max (soybean), and Oryza Sativa (rice).222  The fact of the 
matter is that the prior art did show and suggested that one in the art should 
combine the knowledge of genetic sequencing with any and all valuable crop 
species.223  Specifically here, Fisher was working with maize, a monocot plant, and 
one would imagine that such differences between previously identified monocot 
and dicot plants would not be so different that the results would be unusual.224
Thus, the scope and content of the prior art suggests that the sequences, while 
novel, may have been obvious to one skilled in the art.225
2. Differences Between the Prior Art and the Claims at Issue 
The differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are relatively 
small.226  All gene sequence patents essentially hold out the same or similar claims 
as the Fisher patent.227  The prior art would likely suggest using the ESTs in the 
manner suggested by the Fisher patent.228  Thus the difference between the art and 
the claims is small and would suggest that the patent may be obvious to one skilled 
in the art.229  But we need to be wary of gathering the “prior art with the invention 
in mind,” as hindsight is a dangerous weapon against any patent.230
                                                          
220 Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365. 
221 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Taxonomy/Browser/wwwtax.cgi?id=381124 (last visited January 
29, 2007). 
222 Id.  While not relevant to the prior art, it is interesting to note that the current database found at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Taxonomy/Browser/wwwtax.cgi?id=381124 (last visited January 29, 
2007), includes some 486,480 nucleotides for the maize genome.  It is relevant to point out how easily 
such sequences are produced, and in 2003 or earlier, when Fisher was creating the sequences at issue, 
such mechanized or computerized systems were available and in use.  Id.
223 See Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365. 
224 See http://www.ucmp.berkeley.edu/glossary/gloss8/monocotdicot.html which discusses the 
differences between monocot and dicot plants.  The essential issue being that as long as there was a 
single monocot plant that was in the prior art, it would have been obvious to one in the art, and would 
have been reasonably likely to succeed, creating ESTs for the maize genome. 
225 See Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365. 
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 See Pentec, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp, 776 F.2d 309 (1985), where the court held “prior art 
may not be gathered with the claimed invention in mind.”
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3. The Level of Ordinary Skill in the Pertinent Art 
Here, we find that the ordinary skill in the relevant art is actually very low.231
Many entry level biologists, chemists, chemical engineers, and geneticists work in 
the numerous small and large companies throughout the world on sequencing 
plants and animals.232  Such analysis is almost always done on a computerized or 
mechanized program and can be taught even to those not skilled in the relevant 
art.233  While higher level understanding may be more advanced, I would suggest 
that there are many thousands of persons who would understand the issues at hand.  
But one needs to be cautious that they are not looking at such a patent in 
hindsight.234  Clearly today, just some five years later, the patent may seem 
obvious, but at the time it may have been more nuanced that we would expect.235
4. Secondary Considerations 
If we conclude that simply because a patented invention has financial 
benefits for its inventor, or that it has a clearly defined market, then we would have 
to conclude that ESTs are non-obvious.236  But the success of an invention in the 
market is considered in the secondary considerations aspect of the non-obviousness 
analysis.237  Here, the value of Fisher’s EST sequences is significant and Fisher 
may even be able to make significant profit from the invention; yet that does not 
mean that it should be patentable.238  Instead, other means of protection (such as 
trade secret) might serve as an appropriate vehicle for Fisher to profit from the 
invention for a limited time.239
Graham v. John Deere provides a set of factors in which to analyze the 
patent against prior art.240  The four factor test suggests that the Fisher patent is 
                                                          
231 See Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365. 
232 See supra note 202. 
233 Id.
234 Graham, 383 U.S. 1. 
235 Webster Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580, 591 (1881), where the court first warned of the 
dangers of hindsight stating: “[I]t is plain, from the evidence and from the very fact that it was not 
sooner adopted and used, that it did not, for years, occur  . . . to even the most skillful persons. It may 
have been under their very eyes, they may almost be said to have stumbled over it; but they certainly 
failed to see it, to estimate its value and to bring it into notice. . . . Now that it has succeeded, it may 
seem very plain to anyone, that he could have done it as well. This is often the case with inventions of 
the greatest merit. It may be laid down as a general rule, though perhaps not an invariable one, that if a 
new combination and arrangement of known elements produce a new and beneficial result, never 
attained before, it is evidence of invention.” 
236 Through the mid 1990’s at least six larger firms had spent at least $100 million on licensing fees 
for EST sequences.  http://www.nap.edu/readingroom/books/property/5.html (last visited January 31, 
2007). 
237 See Graham, 383 U.S. 1. 
238 See Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365. 
239 Trade secret protection is available as a form of intellectual property “protection.”  While there 
is no actual hard and fast protection in trade secret, one is protected if the information is stolen or 
misappropriated from the company.  Id.  Trade secret is a commonly used form of protection, with the 
most famous trade secret, being the formula for Coca Cola®.
240 See Graham, 383 U.S. 1. 
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likely taught by the relevant art, but nonetheless it may still produce novel 
sequences.241  Thus we create a problem where novel and valuable information is 
created, but it is created through a process that may have been obvious to anyone 
in the art, and it may have only been created later because of cost.242  Thus, the 
nonobvious standard would be a superior method to analyzing the Fisher patent. 
VI. EFFECTS OF THE FISHER LIMITATION
What Fisher actually accomplishes is limiting the scope of the claims of EST 
applications.243  Due to this limitation there will be some unwanted 
consequences.244  The Fisher court claimed that there is no utility unless there can 
be conferred “real world benefit.”245  The problems that exist associated with 
attributing this so called “real world benefit” are that the true benefits can only be 
seen through hindsight.246  Many patents are given for products that turn out later 
to have absolutely no value, but since they are judged at the time of filing it is 
impossible to say whether or not they have utility.247  The same logic should 
follow here with the EST sequences; we will not know what is useful until some 
years later.248  It is not the job of the USPTO to recognize on first glance those 
inventions that will provide incremental gains into scientific knowledge; rather, it 
is the job of the USPTO to give rights to those who want to patent inventions 
which may lead to these incremental gains.249
Returning to the hypothetical at the beginning, SMALL did not file a patent 
application because of the inherent limitations on its proposed claims.  Instead, 
consider the situation where multiple companies might each independently be 
working on the same gene or idea due to the lack of patents on that issue.  Each 
group might then be working on the same issues and, as a result, each might end up 
reinventing the wheel.  Thus, without the public disclosure there would be a 
duplication of resources which is excessive.250  This does not benefit society at 
                                                          
241 See Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365. 
242 It is expensive to not only purchase the necessary computers and machines to properly sequence, 
but it is extremely labor intensive to ensure that the work is done properly under laboratory conditions 
and that it is replicable for future experiments.  The Maize genome was a secondary project to 
Arabidopsis, because it is much longer than the Arabidopsis genome.  Arabidopsis was completed in 
2000, with five chromosomes and between 120 and 130 million base pairs.  
http://www.arabidopsis.org/portals/genAnnotation/gene_structural_annotation/agicomplete.jsp  (last 
visited January 31, 2007).  While the maize genome boasts ten chromosomes and some 2.5 billion 
nucleotides, see http://www.maizegenome.org (last visited January 31, 2007). 
243 Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365. 
244 See id.  One of many cases where a patent was not conferred due to the restrictions placed upon 
inventors by the USPTO.  In the case of Fisher, time has not yet told whether the invention was truly 
novel and useful. 
245 Id. at 1371. 
246 By this I mean that it is difficult to envision which products will eventually be a success.  For 
example, if everyone knew that the “George Foreman Grill” would be so successful, someone would 
have made it earlier. 
247 Van Cleave, supra note 74. 
248  Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1381. 
249 Id.
250 U.S. Const. art I § 8 cl. 8. 
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large; in fact, it contradicts the purpose of patents as promotions of inventions and 
stifles the inventive process.251
A second negative impact from the Fisher decision is that because of the 
limitation and restriction on claims, companies such as SMALL might be hesitant 
to research into “dead end” pathways or proteins due to their patent claims being 
limited without a known target.252  This, also, seems contrary to the purpose of 
patents.  Society should encourage the type of research that will lead to 
revolutionary discoveries such as curing debilitating diseases and eradicating 
harmful viruses and bacteria.  Without companies such as SMALL researching into 
highly unpredictable areas we will limit the future of American research and allow 
such inventions to be born outside of the United States. 
To fix the issue at hand, ESTs need to be recognized as “research tools” and 
given their due as such.  This means that while one cannot file infinite patents of 
every known 350bp combination,253 the standards for utility of an EST should 
return to the pre-Fisher standard.254  ESTs as “research tools” are useful and to 
find them unpatentable, one needs to seek another hurdle.  This hurdle should 
instead be one of obviousness, as suggested in Justice Rader’s dissent.255
This issue demands a solution.  One suggestion would be that an inventor 
would have to prove that there were no other known markers on the same gene 
before a patent could be awarded on that EST.  Another possible answer is to 
create a separate class of patents for such sequences in general, possibly giving a 
seven year exclusive period instead of twenty years, or some other shorter 
duration.  Finally, ESTs could be limited to one per gene, and would be required to 
be of a set length.  Regardless if these suggestions affect current law, these 
suggestions would hold that for many species no more EST patents would be 
available.  For many species, the underlying sequences have been publicly 
accessible within the past few years, thereby relegating them to being obvious.  
These solutions will meet the goals of the USPTO in limiting EST applications; 
yet, more importantly, they will still award novel EST applications their proper 
patent protection. 
VII. CONCLUSION
While we can understand the Court of Appeals wanting to help the USPTO 
limit the EST sequence applications, we should also recognize that more benefit 
has come from EST sequences in areas such as cancer research than many other 
research tools before them.256  Rejecting ESTs for obviousness would simplify the 
USPTO’s problem, while ESTs identified in novel areas or areas of interest would 
still find utility and would therefore protect the investment of the company.  This 
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252 Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365. 
253 As a reference, the five EST sequences in the Fisher patent were 429, 423, 365, 411, and 311 
base pairs long.  Id. 
254 See e.g. Brenner, 383 U.S. 519. 
255 Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1382. 
256 Id. at 1380. 
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would then again help promote the discovery of novel sequences. 
In our hypothetical, under an obviousness claim, SMALL would have known 
that its EST was useful under the patent laws.  But it would have had to face the 
task of proving that the invention and the sequence was not obvious in light of the 
prior art.257  But, by pursuing the patent the public would have been aware of the 
gene and its potential implications on disease XYZ and other companies might 
have either licensed the patent or found a way to work around it while still 
focusing on the gene.  This would then promote the furtherance of scientific 
inquiry on the topic and, in time, would save resources and lead to faster 
developments regarding the treatment of XYZ. 
Allowing judges to decide what is and is not useful is not only foolish, but it 
is a waste of such judicial resources.  Judges are not usually skilled in the relevant 
art – nor can we say today what may or may not be useful tomorrow.  It is the role 
of patent law to allow for new inventions without creating undue hurdles.  
Furthermore, we want to promote discovery, not limit the creation of new and 
useful works of art. 
Patent application for EST sequences should face the burden of obviousness, 
not that of utility.  There is strong evidence to prove that an EST sequence has at 
least some laboratory utility and that alone should be sufficient to overcome the 
minimal burden of the utility standard.258  Obviousness is a stronger standard and 
faces a more demanding proof, but with more factual analysis.  In this manner, 
obviousness can reduce judicial interpretations of what is and is not useful. 
                                                          
257 KSR Int’l Co. v Teleflex Inc.,, 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).  Here, the analysis of the Graham factors 
would clear up the issue of what makes a particular sequence obvious over another.  Id.  Similarly, it 
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